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DC on Parker case (Wash. Post).
Here's a WashPo op-ed by the mayor and something called the Attorney General of DC on the case.
Not terribly illuminating. (1) Nevermind the text and history, the courts didn't recognize this right before and thus shouldn't now; (2) the 2nd Amendment only covers the Federal government ... uh, and while DC is part of that government, it ought to be treated like a State anyway; (3) complete prohibition of handguns is "reasonable regulation" because you can own other types of arms (not mentioning... with a police permit, and only if they are disassembled or trigger-locked. No sense making life dangerous for DC's criminal class).
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"reasonable regulation"
There is no "reasonable" way to infringe that which "shall not be infringed." End of reasonable argument.
Here is an interesting early case dealing with issues involved in the current Petition. A lot of good arguments. The case can be read in full at http://www.virginia1774.org/CustisvLane.html Custis v. Lane, 17 Va. 3 Munf. 579, (1813).
”The case made by the appellant in his declaration was, that having been born within the commonwealth of Virginia, and being resident in that part of the county of Fairfax, which now constitutes a part of the district of Columbia, at the time when that district was ceded to the United States, he had resided there ever since; but had never, by any act of his own, relinquished his character of citizen of Virginia; that, on the 17th of April, 1809, he offered to vote at the election of members of the general Assembly, for the said county of Fairfax, in virtue of a freehold estate, of more than 100 acres of land, held by him in that county, and within the limits of this commonwealth; but was prohibited therefrom by the defendant….
We infer this diversity, from its being stated in the declaration that the appellant was inhabiting within the district of Columbia at the time of its separation from this commonwealth; he was consequently expatriated thereby from the government of Virginia.
The act of Virginia, on the subject of expatriation, relates only to individual cases; it does not relate to those public and general acts of expatriation, by cession, or otherwise, which are more or less incident to all governments and countries. With respect to the particular cession now in question, it was contemplated and provided for by the constitution of the United States, agreed to by the commonwealth of Virginia, by its act tendering the territory to the general government, and also by the congress of the United States, who accepted the cession. To all these acts the appellant, by his representatives, was a party. He has therefore, no reason to complain that he has been cut off from the dominion of Virginia, in consideration of, perhaps, adequate advantages. That he is no longer within the jurisdiction of the commonwealth of Virginia, is manifest from this consideration, that congress are vested, by the constitution, with exclusive power of legislation over the territory in question; and it is only by the consent and courtesy of congress that any of the laws of Virginia have been permitted to operate therein. This last fact will be fully manifested by recurring to the several acts of congress on the subject. It follows, that the district of Columbia being without the jurisdiction of the laws of Virginia, is, as to it, another and distinct jurisdiction, and that the appellant is not merely a citizen of Virginia, abiding, or inhabiting therein, but passed, with that territory, from the jurisdiction of this commonwealth, by the act of cession, and owes no allegiance thereto....With respect to the right of a citizen, or subject, of a foreign government, to intermeddle with the civil polity of Virginia, and, especially, to exercise the all important function of legislation, the matter cannot admit of a possible doubt. Such subjects, or citizens, cannot exercise this inestimable right, as they owe to the commonwealth no corresponding duties, and would not be amenable to the laws by them enacted. They cannot exercise this right in person, for their personal attendance may be necessary, at the same time, in their own country; and, besides, in time of war, they would be prohibited from coming here for the purpose.”